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STATUTORY CONTROL OF CAMPUS DISORDERS IN WASHINGTON: EFFECT

OF R.C.W.

§§ 28B.10.570-.573 (1970).

Disgust with America's involvement in Southeast Asia, with the
slow progress towards racial equality and with the "unresponsiveness"
of the federal government and universities has resulted in hundreds of
campus disruptions across the nation.1 These disruptions often result
2
in property destruction, interruption of classes, and physical violence.
In response to these disorders and public concern, many state legislatures have enacted criminal statutes directed specifically at prohibiting
3
conduct which may result in campus disruptions.
In 1970, the Washington Legislature enacted a campus disorder
statute which makes it unlawful for any person to "intimidate by any
threat of force or violence," or "interfere by force or violence" with
any university, college, community college, or public school administrator, teacher or student who is peacefully discharging his duties. 4 A
conviction of the crime carries a maximum penalty of six months im5
prisonment and a fine of five hundred dollars.
This note examines the scope of the new statute, its constitutionality and its potential for furthering the purposes of the criminal law. It
is submitted that while the Washington statute can withstand the constitutional tests of vagueness and overbreadth, it is applicable to only
a very narrow range of situations, and therefore will have no significant effect in furthering the purposes of the criminal law.
Before one can speculate on the constitutionality and possible value
of the campus disorder legislation it is necessary to examine the scope
of the situations in which the law is applicable. The new statute does
not specify the intent required for conviction of the crime. Neverthe1. See REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST ix (1970). This
Commission was appointed to investigate the causes of campus disorders following the
shooting of four Kent State University students by National Guardsmen during a
campus demonstration.
2. Of the forty-one incidents of campus protest in Washington State from January 1,
1969 through May, 1970, twenty fell outside the classification of orderly demonstrations. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE,
STUDENT UNREST IN WASHINGTON 80-83 (1971).
3. See Comment, Recent California Campus Disorder Legislation, 8 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 310 (1971).
4. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B.10.570-.573 (1970).
5. In 1971 the Washington legislature struck the words "public school" from the
1970 law and dispelled any doubt that the statute applied to secondary schools by in-

cluding the penal sanctions under the statute dealing with common schools. Ch. 45, §§
1-8 [1971] Wash. Sess. Laws 91.
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less, since the conduct prohibited is an offense malum in se, as distinguished from an offense malum prohibitum,6 the statute implicitly
requires that the actor have a guilty mind to be held criminally responsible. 7 Therefore, the statute should not extend to anyone who
has no intention of forcibly interfering with or intimidating a student,
faculty member or administrator even though his conduct may inadvertently do so.
The statute is more explicit in proscribing the acts required to impose punishment. It provides that prohibited conduct must contain
one of two elements. The actor must either forcibly or violently interfere with an administrator, faculty member, or student who is peacefully performing his duties or studies, or he must "intimidate by threat
of force or violence" one of the same.
The term "force or violence" is commonly used in defining the
crime of robbery. 8 The term is narrowly construed in the criminal law
in that it does not include the muscular effort used in accomplishing
the result, but rather requires that exertion be exercised in actually
overcoming resistance or in weakening the victim. 9 For example, the
muscular effort used to pick another's pocket would not be sufficient
force or violence to constitute robbery, but if force is exercised either
in overcoming the victim's resistance or in overtly attacking the victim
the elements of robbery would exist. 10 Likewise, under the campus dis6. Malm in se and mialum prohibitum offenses have been distinguished as follows:
"An offense malum in se is properly defined as one which is naturally evil as adjudged
by the sense of the civilized community, whereas an act malum prohibitum is wrong
only because the statute made it so." State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 589, 51 S.E. 945,
946 (1905).
7. This is a basic common law proposition. Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes
at Commnon Law, 6 CAMB. L.J. 31 (1936). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (3) (Pro-

posed Official Draft, 1962) which provides that if no mental element is required by the
statute, "such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly
with respect thereto." Under the same section it provides that to act "recklessly" the
actor must have a conscious awareness of the risk involved. Id. § 2.02 (3) (2) (C).
This proposition has been continuously adhered to by the Washington Supreme
Court. For example, in State v. Dixon, 78 Wn.2d 796, 479 P.2d 931 (1971). the court
held that Washington's unlawful assembly statute which, like the new campus disorder
statute, makes no mention of the requisite mens rea, was nalum in se and, therefore,
required a guilty mind. The court held the law would not extend to innocent bystanders
or those ignorant of the assembly's unlawful character.
8. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.75.010 (1956).
9. Carter Drug Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 181 Wash. 146, 42 P.2d 37 (1935), State
v. Massey 274 Mo. 578, 204 S.W. 541 (1918), Williams v. Commonwealth. 20 Ky. L.
Rptr. 1850, 50 S.W. 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 1899).
10. Williams v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1850, 50 S.W. 240 (Ky. Ct. App.
1899); Terry v. National Surety Co., 164 Miss. 394, 145 So. 111 (1933); Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 253 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1952).
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order statute, any person making noise and using obscene language in
a demonstration would not be criminally responsible even though his
expression may interfere with or intimidate an administrator, student,
or faculty member; the effort he exerts in talking and marching is
analogous to the exertion used by the pickpocket in removing the
goods from the victim's pocket. However, if the actor was to assault a
student, faculty member, or administrator or directly attack one of
them, he would be criminally responsible under the new law. By using
the term "force or violence," the legislature substantially limited the
class of cases in which the new law is applicable.
In addition to overt manifestations of force or violence, the new
statute makes unlawful any conduct or expression which "intimidates
by threat of force or violence" an administrator, faculty member, or
student. This clause requires that three elements be present before
punishment under the law is justified. First, there must be a threat.
The term "threat" has a sinister meaning and has been defined by the
Washington Supreme Court as the "declaration of one's purpose or
intention to work injury to the person, property or rights of another.""
To constitute a threat, a statement must tend to "incite mental apprehension and be coercive in nature.' 2 Advisory statements, 13 vulgar and
abusive epithets,' 4 and warnings that one will defend himself if attacked
by another 15 have all been held to lack the sinister qualities required
for a threat. Moreover, a statement will constitute a threat only if it
is given under circumstances which create a reasonable apprehension
16
that the speaker will perform the threatened act.
Second, in addition to requiring a threat, the statute requires that
the threat must be of force or violence. Third, the law requires that
11.

State v. Cushing, 17 Wash. 544, 555, 50 P. 512, 515 (1897).
12. State v. Hamre, 247 Ore. 359, 429 P.2d 804 (1967).
13. People v. Randazzio, 184 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909) (police official did not
threaten the accused by insisting that he tell the truth).
14.
Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S.C. 553, 99 S.E. 350, 351 (1919) (defendant did
not threaten operator by saying "If I were there, I would break your God damned

neck.").
15.

State v. Cushing, 17 Wash. 544, 50 P. 512 (1897).

16.

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Therein the Court stated in

holding that the petitioner did not threaten the President of the United States when he
said, "If they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.BJ."
The language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputes [and

for that matter campus demonstrations] is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.
We agree with petitioner that his only offense was a very crude offensive method of

stating a political opposition to the President.
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the force or violence threatened must actually intimidate an administrator, faculty member, or student. The law does not forbid the intimidation of a campus visitor, a campus vagrant, 1 7 or a student, faculty
member or administrator not peacefully discharging his duties. Moreover, intimidation may be difficult to prove, since it is defined by the
criminal law as "putting in fear." t 8 Even though the actor's conduct
may annoy or perturb some, punishment under the statute would not
be justified without a showing of actual interference or a "putting in
fear."
Thus, Washington's campus disorder statute is useful in only a narrow range of situations. ): To justify punishment the prosecutor must
prove that the actor had criminal intent. In addition, the prosecutor
must either show that the actor's conduct was forceful or violent or
that the quality of his conduct was sufficient to create reasonable apprehension and actually did arouse such fear in an administrator,
teacher, or student. These limitations will probably save the statute
from constitutional attack.
Today, students and faculty at public institutions possess the constitutional rights of free speech and assembly and do not "shed these
rights at the school house gate."'2 0 Criminal statutes which potentially
interfere with these first amendment freedoms are popular targets for
constitutional challenges of vagueness and overbreadth.2 1 These doctrines have been consistently asserted in school disruption cases. 22
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (1963) defines a campus vagrant as one who "loiters" about a school "without a lawful purpose."
18. Armstrong v. Ellington, 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Shehany v.
Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930).
19. Other recent cases narrowly construing the phrase "intimidation by threats"
include Armstrong v. Ellington, 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) and Landry
v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. III. 1968), rev'd on other grounds itbnora. Boyle
v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
20. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See also
Wright, The Colotiitttion on the Campus. 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969).
21.
See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67, 75 (1960). The writer thoroughly reviews the Supreme Court cases involving
the doctrine and concludes:
The doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme
Court almost invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection of the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.
22. For example, both defenses were asserted in: State v. Zwicker. 41 Wis. 2d 497, 164
N.W. 2d 512 (1969) (accused was convicted under a disorderly conduct statute for using
signs at a campus demonstration); State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37, cert.
denied 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (accused was convicted under a statute making it unlawful
for any person "to willfully interrupt or disturb any public or private school"); In re
Bacon, 240 Cal. App.2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr. 322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (accused was con-
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Vagueness and overbreadth have been defined as follows: 23
The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and
proper standards for adjudication. The primary issues involved are
whether the provisions of a penal statute are sufficiently definite to
give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who wish to
avoid its penalties and to apprise the judge and jury of standards for
determination of guilt....
The concept of overbreath, on the other hand, rests on the principle
of substantive due process which forbids the prohibition of certain
individual freedoms. The primary issue is not reasonable notice or
adequate standards. Rather the issue is whether the language of the
statute, given its normal meaning, is so broad that its sanctions may
apply to conduct protected by the Constitution.
The conduct proscribed by the campus disorder statute is to "interfere
by force or violence with" or "intimidate by threat of force or violence," any school administrator, teacher, or student. 2 4 Case authority
suggests this language is not "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application, ' 25 nor is it overly broad.
Courts have had little difficulty in upholding as sufficiently definite
statutes which make it unlawful to "interfere" with another. 26 The
word "intimidate," accepted in criminal law as synonymous with "putting in fear" at common law, 2 7 has also been upheld against attacks of
vagueness when the method of intimidation is proscribed. 28 Moreover,
since both the words "interference" and "intimidation" are followed

victed under statute making it unlawful to remain at a place of unlawful assembly after
being warned to disperse); State v. Dixon, 78 Wn. 2d 796, 479 P.2d 931 (1971); State v.

Oyen, 78 Wn.2d 909, 480 P.2d 766 (1971).
23. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. Il1. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds sub nora. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
24. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B.10.510.573 (1970).
25. Conally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (Sutherland, J.). See
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
26. See, e.g., State v. Furino, 85 N.J. Super. 345, 204 A.2d 718 (App. Div. 1964).
For a collection of the cases which have held that statutes prohibiting obstruction, interference, and annoyance were not unconstitutionally vague, see Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d
1448 (1967).
27. See note 18, supra.
28. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Ellington, 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970). But
the three-judge district court held that a statute prohibiting "intimidation," but not
specifying the method of "intimidation," would be subject to a vagueness attack.
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in the statute by the more definite phrase "force or violence,"
29
the entire statute takes on a greater clarity and specificity.
Recent Supreme Court and Washington decisions further support
the conclusion that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. In
Heard v. Rizzo, 30 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's finding that a Pennsylvania statute declaring it unlawful to make
"any loud noise or disturbance to the annoyance of the peaceable residents" was not unconstitutionally vague. The Washington Supreme
Court, in State v. Dixon,3 1 upheld, against an attack based on vagueness, Washington's unlawful assembly statute, which makes it unlawful for three or more persons to "disturb the public peace;"
the court declared that a statute is presumed constitutional, that it will
be so construed even though subject to more than one interpretation,
and that to be declared void the statute must appear unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt. 32 It appears that the new campus disorder
statute goes further in setting adjudicative standards and "apprising
the man of common intelligence what conduct is punishable" than
either of the statutes upheld in Heard and Dixon. Although the legislature may have severely limited the application of the campus disorder statute by employing the term "force or violence," this terminology
sufficiently apprises the common man of what conduct is punishable.
Surviving an attack on grounds of vagueness, the Washington
statute might still be attacked as overly broad. Although the concept of
overbreadth has been criticized as being too harsh, 33 the doctrine is
firmly rooted in constitutional jurisprudence. 34 If a statute purports to

29. In Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332, appeal dismissed 340 U.S. 881
(1950), the court regarded the terms "force or violence" as providing the requisite specificity to save the constitutionality of a Maryland statute. See Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (same interpretation of the same statute).
30. 392 U.S. 646 (1968).
31. 78 Wn.2d 796, 479 P.2d931 (1971).
32. In State v. Oyen, 78 Wn.2d 909, 480 P.2d 766 (1971), the Washington Supreme
Court enumerated the same principles in upholding WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (1971)
which makes it unlawful for one to "willfully loiter" about a school "without a lawful
purpose."
33. See Wright, supra note 22, at 1066. Therein the author states:
This rule [overbreadth doctrine], that one who has violated a clear statute by conduct not constitutionally protected may nevertheless have the statute declared void
on its face if it also purports to reach other behavior that is protected by the first
amendment, has always seemed to me an exorbitant price to pay to avoid the
"chilling effect" it is feared the overbroad statute will have on protected expression.
34. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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outlaw behavior protected by the first amendment, it will be rendered
void and unenforceable even against one whose conduct falls outside
the first amendment. 35 In order to determine if the statute is overly
broad, it is necessary to determine if the conduct proscribed infringes
36
upon the expression protected by the first amendment.
It cannot be seriously argued that acts of force or violence directed
at another are protected by the first amendment. The courts have long
recognized the state's critical interests in protecting the safety of its
citizens by holding that expression through acts of force or violence
falls outside the protection of the first amendment.3 7 Nor would it
appear that the statutory prohibition of "intimidation by threat of
force or violence" is constitutionally suspect. Although a threat is a
statement and, in form, speech, the courts have held that actual
threats of force or violence are unreasonable menaces and not protected by the first amendment. 38
In attempting to determine the impact the campus disorder statute
will have in furthering the objectives of the criminal law, several initial observations should be made. First, this statute leaves no doubt
that the legislature intends the criminal law to be used in punishing
those who resort to force or violence on the campus.3 9 Second, the
new law adds nothing to the scope of conduct punishable under other
Washington law. 40 Washington's riot statute41 already makes it un-

35. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
36. For a discussion of the problems posed by attempting to determine whether a
statute is overly broad, see T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1966); Wright, supra note 22.
37. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). See also Note, Regulation of
Demonstrations,80 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1774-75 (1967).
38. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Armstrong v. Ellington, 312 F.
Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Gurein v. State, 209 Ark. 1082, 193 S.W.2d 997 (1946).

In Watts, the Court held that a statute prohibiting "threats" to the health of the President was constitutional. The Court specifically excluded threats from first amendment
protection, stating that a "threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.

Statutes prohibiting intimidation, but not specifying the means of intimidation, may
be deemed unconstitutionally broad. In Armstrong, the court pointed out that a statute
prohibiting "intimidation" curtails expression.
39.
40.

See note 47 and accompanying text, infra.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.060 (1956) (unlawful assembly); § 9.87.010 (1971) (loi-

tering on school property without a lawful purpose); § 9.27.040 (1959) (rioting); §
9.33.060 (1959) (coercion); § 9.11.010-.050 (1956) (assault); § 9.27.080 (1959) (destruction of any dwelling or other building while unlawfully assembled); § 9.83.080 (1971)

(entering a public building without license or privilege); § 28A.87.010 (1969) (insulting
a teacher); § 28A. 87.060 (1969) (disrupting school meetings).
41. Id.§ 9.27.040 (1959).
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lawful for three or more persons to use force or violence in disturbing
the public peace, threatening to disturb the public peace, or doing any
unlawful act, and Washington's assault 42 and coercion 43 statutes adequately cover the class of cases where force or violence is exerted or
threatened by less than three. However, whether a new statute adds to
or duplicates existing legislation is by no means the sole criterion in
determining its worth. In the final analysis, the true test must be the
extent to which the new law furthers the purposes of the criminal law.4
Deterrence is still one of the primary goals of the criminal law.
The value of deterrence rests on the assumption that the citizen will
have knowledge of a criminal prohibition, will think before he acts,
and will base his actions on a careful calculation of the gains and
losses involved. 45 Arguably, the new statute could promote the deterrent
function in three ways. First, it strengthens the possibility that the
community will have knowledge of a criminal prohibition against the
use of force or violence on campus. Second, if school administrators
and law enforcement officials demonstrate that they are willing to
enforce a statute tailor-made for the campus, then the threat of punishment to the potential criminal will be greater. Third, the statute
may have a "moralizing" effect4 6 on the community by promoting the
idea that the campus is a place where there should be open, controversial discussion free from the threat of force and violence.
Although these observations might support the new law, the more
persuasive arguments suggest the new statute will not significantly
deter disruptive behavior. It is doubtful that the new statute will be of
much informational value. Most citizens are aware that it is unlawful
to forcibly or violently interfere with another. Any reluctance on the
part of school officials to use the criminal law has probably not been a
result of their distaste for the existing law, but rather has been due to
47
a general reluctance to use any criminal law in the campus situation.
42. Id. §§ 9.11.010-.050 (1959).
43. Id. § 9.33.060 (1959). If one, intending to compel another to do or not do an
act, attempts "to intimidate such person by threats or force," he could be found guilty of
coercion.
See B. Wooi rON, CRIME CONIROL AND
44.

rIlE COMMON LAW 97-103 (1963).
45. See generally Gardiner. The Purposes of Criminal Punishmuent, 21 MODERN L.
REV. 117, 122-25 (1958).
46. The "moralizing" effect of the criminal law is deterring conduct by strengthening the moral inhibitions against the conduct. Andenaes, General Prevention--Illusion or Reality? 43 J. CR15M. L.C. & P.S. 176, 179-81 (1952).
47. Just how sympathetic faculty members are to student unrest was indicated by a
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Furthermore, many campus incidents of violence are a result of political and quasi-political activities in which, demonstrators advocate
martyrdom and seek confrontation; 48 there can be little doubt that
participants in the 1970 demonstrations at the University of Washington knew that it was against the law to destroy property, physically
abuse other students, and drastically interrupt the operation of the
school. 49 Also, it must be remembered that campus disruptions are
often a result of the dissatisfaction of students, faculty members, and
others with existing social conditions. Therefore, increased enactment
and enforcement of penal statutes aimed directly at the campus may
have a boomerang effect by increasing hostility and the possibility of
more disruptions.
In addition to failing to effect deterrence, it is difficult to see how
the statute will further other goals of the criminal law. Incarceration
and retribution are well recognized functions5 0 of the criminal law.
Neither purpose is enhanced by the new law, however, because the
statute has not expanded the scope of conduct which is punishable.
Nor in all likelihood will the statute help society rehabilitate 51 disruptive students. Since disorderly students are motivated by a dislike for
present society, jail sentences and monetary fines are unlikely to
change their attitudes.
The Washington Legislature obviously felt a need to demonstrate
to the people of Washington its general concern for campus disruptions occurring prior to the 1970 legislature. The campus disorder
statute was enacted to satisfy this pressing need. It is a law which appears not to be unconstitutional but which is applicable in only a very
narrow range of cases and will probably not significantly further the
general functions of the criminal law. It is a law which is consistent
survey conducted by the American Council on Education during 1967-68. The survey
indicated that faculty members were involved in the planning of over half the student
protests and that faculty bodies passed resolutions approving over two-thirds of the protests. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST 81 (1970).
48. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST (1970), and

Comment, Recent California Campus Disorder Legislation, 8 HARV. J. LEGIs. 310

(1971).
49. For a detailed description of the events on the University of Washington campus
in May, 1970 which were precipitated by the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State
tragedy, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE,

STUDENT UNREST INWASHINGTON 40-57 (1971).
50. See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 125-27 (2d.
ed. 1969).
51. Id.
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with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Campus
Unrest and the Joint Committee on Higher Education of the Washington State Legislature in that it denounces campus violence, but
leaves control of nonviolent campus disruptions with the university,
an institution which is more flexible than the criminal law and better
equipped to deal with campus problems.
Other campus disruption bills, including a bill which appears to be
more restrictive than any other state disruption statute, have been recently introduced into the Washington Legislature,5 2 but have not met
with approval. The present statute is still the legislature's answer to
campus disruptions. Hopefully, it is the final answer.

52. Of the many campus disruption bills drafted last year by Washington legislators, the Guess Bill was certainly one of the most restrictive bills drafted. Its provisions
included expulsion of students for possession of fire crackers or violation of campus
traffic regulations, and termination of a faculty member's salary upon the filing of a
complaint by a legislator. Wash. S. Bill 518, Reg. Sess., [ 1971 ].
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